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Innovations in incapacity: Education, technique, subject 
 
A. J. Bartlett 
 
Abstract 
 
This essay addresses the question of change as it is expressed in debates on the 
introduction and use of new digital technologies in contemporary education. It sets out 
some of the terms of this debate, concerning MOOCs in particular, and puts into 
question the very conception of change they presume. The essay advocates a distinction 
between education, which marks the subjective capacity of all for thought, and pedagogy, 
which, the essay argues, teaches subjective incapacity for all. The case is made that 
without a formal conception of change MOOCs will only strengthen the contemporary 
pedagogical project of difference as repetition. In conclusion, the essay attempts to sketch a 
conception of real change such that a new orientation to the debate is proposed.  
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The contemporary “debate” concerning the educational effects or affects of digital 
technology on education attracts philosophical attention. This is not because philosophy 
is some instrument of censure or tribunal of value ruling sovereign over all discourse. 
There are three reasons:  
 
1. These debates deploy rhetoric and aver conceptual elaborations that are 
themselves drawn from philosophy 
2. Insofar as these debates make general claims as to the novelty or inventive 
aspects of these technologies over and above their technical application and 
effect, philosophy, ever concerned by the new, by how it comes to be and its 
consequences, is compelled to take note 
3. Since Plato at least, education and the subject of education have been intrinsic 
matters for philosophy. Being intrinsic to philosophy means that education is 
linked, as a matter of course, to truths. The link between truths and subjectivity 
is what matters, for truths orient the subject of education to its situation in a way 
distinct from that which the knowledge of education prescribes. This is the 
invariant aspect of education, the basis of real change. 
 
What follows is partly intervention, partly analysis. Based on the “simple” contention 
that the production of a truth, in a situation, is what education names, this essay argues 
that a) educational change must be thought differently from the regimes of change 
dominant today and b) be directed specifically against the forms of knowledge these 
regimes presume to be the knowledge of education. We are thinking here of the 
collection of educational discourses familiar to everybody today, which range from 
constructivism to neoliberal reformism, and which regularly make certain claims about 
educational knowledge, as about how best to harness its effects. The key point is that 
these regimes, if apparently quite diverse in their presentation, are nonetheless united at 
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the level of their knowledge-operations and subjective effects. The contention is that 
these regimes, insofar as they condition the contemporary conception of education, 
produce what we call a subjective incapacity—and not, as these regimes necessarily claim, 
new capacities. This incapacity can be defined as: that form of the subject whose very 
knowledge of itself as subject is the condition of its non-knowledge of its own subjection. 
Each act of this subject, correlated to the knowledge of the world for which such a 
subject exists is an act of the (re)production or better, the preservation of this 
incapacity. This incapacity, entirely co-terminus with the form of a world for which 
modification is its rule, ultimately, is the material form of the impossibility of real change. 
The object of this intervention is the concept of change which predicates debates over 
the role of digital technology in education. The analysis will argue that this concept of 
change is inherently un-educative precisely because it is no change at all. 
 
Currently Dominant Regimes of Educational Knowledge With 
Respect to New Media 
 
Today, there is a major public anxiety over education, prevalent across the globe, whose 
intensity—both rhetorical and reformist—is ratcheted up at any indication that 
education might escape the tight rein of established knowledge. Policy documents from 
Australia, the UK, Europe and the USA are practically unanimous that as the key 
feature and facilitator of developments in the ‘new knowledge economy’ education must 
be ‘constantly’ reformed to meet the demands of the ‘rapidly changing global economy’ 
(Gonski, 2012: WISE, 2011; WB, 2002). Over the course of the last several decades of 
global capitalist educational reform major figures such as Pinar (1975), Bowles and 
Gintis (1976), Althusser (1977), Bourdieu (1979), Foucault (1977), Giroux and 
Aranowitz (1986), Illich (1971), Freire (2005), among many others have elaborated 
various critiques of these reforms and their predicates, establishing strong theoretical 
positions and proposing reforms in turn. Some of these proposals, suitably repurposed, 
have been registered and even appropriated by governmental policy (New Basics, 2001; 
UNESCO, 2011; WB, 2002). A critique of this critique is overdue: if for no other reason 
than to rescue it from the inclusive clutches of the state.  
 The rapid evolution of new media technology has extended and intensified these 
already intense debates about the future of global educational change (Bulut, 2011; 
Jorgensen, 2007; Scholz, 2013). A recent study notes that in the ‘[i]nformation age … 
learning itself is the most dramatic medium of […] change’ (Davidson et al., 2009). 
While another asserts that digital technology, in the form of Massive Online Open 
Courses (MOOC), will usher in a ‘historic transformation’ both in the way education is 
delivered and in the way it is conceived. The ‘four V’s’ of the Web—the sheer amount 
of data out there (volume), offered in so many different modes of delivery (variety), 
available anytime and anywhere (velocity), and at different levels of data depth, 
accessible differentially from novice learners to expert researchers (variability)—
constitute a ‘disruption’ of all existing systems of education (Butin, 2012).1 Although 
critics point to the links between the changes wrought by Internet technologies to 
educational engagement and ‘participation’ and global commercial interests—centred 
especially on the mining of individuals’ data (Dolby, 2004; Scholz et al., 2013)—the 
backing and involvement of elite educational institutions is, it is said, ‘legitimising’ these 
changes, thereby ensuring their impact on the future of education (Hill, 2012). What 
these debates suggest is a tension in contemporary discourse on educational change 
between ‘education as change’ and thus as an inherently unstable site, and ‘changes to 
education’ as the effort to stabilise change itself (Long &Seimans, 2011; Peters, 2011; 
Roche, 2013). This crucial distinction, bearing on our conceptual double—education 
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and subject—will be elaborated further below.  
 One of the key features revealing this tension is the language used to describe the 
impact of new technologies and economic priorities on education. Digital technology is 
said to usher in an “historic transformation” in not only the way education is delivered 
but also in the way it is conceived such that there is the potential for ‘a fundamentally 
new paradigm’ (Butin, 2012). Moreover, the ‘technological revolution’ currently taking 
place in online education which, it is said, has the capacity not only to enable 
information input at a single site to reach anyone on the planet instantly, but allows for 
the sharing of information, work and data across borders and cultures is, it is claimed, 
by virtue of its educational effect, ‘a social revolution’ (Downes, 2005). ‘New 
organizations are being created to offer new kinds of degrees, in a manner and at a price 
that could completely disrupt the enduring college business model’ (Butin, 2012). The 
discourse of the ‘knowledge economy’ has already marked this modal complex of policy, 
economy and technology and is similarly tasked to produce ‘flexible’, ‘adaptable’, 
‘entrepreneurial’ and moral subjects: ‘lifelong learners, adapting continuously to changed 
opportunities, work practises, business models and forms of economic and social 
organization’ (Bartlett, 2011a; New Basics, 2001; WB, 2002;). Thus in conformity with, 
rather than in opposition, key figures in digital media and online learning speak 
constantly of the potential of internet technologies ‘to [change] just about everything 
about how we think about […] education’ given that it is now possible to create ‘a 
never-tiring, self-regulating, self-improving system that supports learning through 
formative on-demand feedback’ (Butin, 2012; Long &Seimans, 2011).  
 Much of this discourse today concentrates in the discussions of MOOCs.‘A MOOC’, 
one expert claims, ‘integrates the connectivity of social networking, the facilitation of an 
acknowledged expert in a field of study, and a collection of freely accessible online 
resources.  It is a ‘course’ that is ‘open, participatory, distributed’ - life-long networked 
learning. It is ‘not a school or just a course,’ but an ‘event’: by which one ‘connects and 
collaborates’—‘engaging   in the learning process itself’ but ‘in a structured way’. Choice, 
this expert says, retroactively confirmed via ‘participation’, is built in. It is ‘a key feature 
all the way through…. And even success is your choice ‘just like real life’(Cormier, 2010a). 
 These events of ‘rhizomatic community engagement’ (Cormier, 2010b) – undefined 
by experts but strangely recognisable to ‘educators’ alone—are said to be effecting a 
‘campus tsunami’, a ‘historic transformation’ and an ‘education revolution’ (Blint, 
2012;Boxall, 2011). That MOOCs, conceived as an event, are said to build on 
‘established distance learning models’ but remain distinct in terms of access and by the 
forms of participation required to make them work, brings to the surface a division well 
known in contemporary continental philosophy between events and consequences; of 
thinking at the same time continuity and discontinuity. At stake in this is the possibility 
of the new itself—that is, for the emergence of something that is not simply a repetition 
of the old in different guise—and, in our reading, finally of any possible subject not 
constituted in some way by the ‘continuities’ of known knowledge.  This means that the 
very form of the relation between ‘event’ and ‘consequences’ impacts decisively on what 
one even understands by education. If the MOOC is both event and real change at once, 
ostensibly sufficient in itself to change the ‘educational paradigm’, we have no subject 
except as pure emergence. If these two are distinct, it is because there is a subject 
unsupported by whatever discourse of continuity is in effect. Concomitantly—and this 
is an internal debating point not an opposition to this educational event/revolution—
questions concerning the ‘educational legitimacy’ of MOOCs, the conditions for their 
possible credentialing, have been solved, it is argued, by the coming on board of so-
called “elite institutions” (Harvard, Stanford, UCLA, Edinburgh, Melbourne etc.), who 
‘are publicly extolling the value and quality potential of online education, and are willing 
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to invest tens of millions of dollars’ (Hill, 2012). Credentialing is key to the capacity of 
these ‘partnerships’ between entities like Coursera, Udacity and edX and these 
institutions to charge fees for these ‘post-courses’ courses. However, this is not where 
the money really is.  
 While ‘change’ is subscribed to by (almost) all participants in the education-
technology debate for some pre-eminent figures in the world of techno-pedagogy such 
as Long and Seimans (2011) and Blint,(2012)who see the changes MOOCs announce as 
more a matter of process, the potential transformative power of MOOCs is far from 
being fully exploited. For these thinkers the ‘analytics’ (data mining capacity) made 
available by MOOCs, specifically by the participants in these so-called ‘post-courses’, 
have been underexploited, and the educational potential they possess are being wasted. 
Analytics means, essentially, that every keystroke, ‘tweet, status update, page read online’ 
can be analysed to ensure that every ‘learner’ is targeted ‘with resources relevant to his 
or her profile, learning goals, and the knowledge domain the learner is attempting to 
master’ (Long &Seimans, 2011).3 ‘The idea is simple yet potentially transformative: … 
Continued growth in the amount of data creates an environment in which new or novel 
approaches are required to understand the patterns of value that exist within the data’ 
(Long &Seimans, 2011). All this, of course, under the coincident network rubric of 
openness, sharing, connectedness, togetherness and community. 
 
Placing the Burden of Change in the Learner who is not a Subject 
 
This discourse of innovation, transformation and change, rooted in the learner, note—in 
a manner not clearly determined but no doubt ideologically prescient—resonates 
throughout the blogs, discussion boards, online journals, academic articles, policy 
documents and book-length research projects devoted to the topic.  One commentator 
sums it like this: 
 
This approach to learning means that learning content is created and 
distributed in a very different manner. Rather than being composed, organized 
and packaged, e-learning content is syndicated, much like a blog post or 
podcast. It is aggregated by students, using their own personal RSS reader or 
some similar application. From there, it is remixed and repurposed with the 
student’s own individual application in mind, the finished product being fed 
forward to become fodder for some other student’s reading and use (Downes 
2005). 
 
For Downes, with all the innocence of one unfamiliar with educational history, this 
means two things: that learning ‘is becoming a creative activity’ and that the ‘venue’ is 
not an ‘application’ but a platform.   What this means, then, is that the notion of the 
medium is (supposedly) finished—platform and learner are synthesised—and 
subjectivity, other than as incapacity, becomes null and void. Because this ‘self-recursive 
stream of numbers’ effectively renders all creativity, precisely media, as inexistent, 
‘consigned to disappear’ as Kittler tellingly remarks, ‘into the black-holes and boxes that, 
as artificial intelligences, are bidding us farewell on their way to nameless high 
commands’ (Kittler 1999; xxxix). To be clear, the problem here is the subjective 
weakness of these ‘new’ technologies and not their overweening power. This weakness 
is precisely expressed in their filial subservience to the prevailing discourses on education, the very 
‘object’ they suppose they are overcoming. We constantly reencounter this structure, 
whereby declared radicality in fact simply rehearses the most archaic aspects of what it 
purports to supersede. Boris Groys pointedly articulates this problem against emergence 
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theories in terms of an inability to grasp the key distinction between what is truly new 
and what is different. ‘Difference’ he points out, citing Kiekergarrd, ‘is recognised as 
such only because we already have the capability to recognise and identify this 
difference as difference. So no difference can ever be new—because if it were really new 
it could not be recognised as difference’ (Groys 2002). 
 Certainly, the rhetoric concerning these new technologies is such that we would 
expect that a real discontinuity or something truly new has been established between 
what passed as education before—and thus its subjects—and the ‘revolution’ or 
‘paradigm shift’ now coming to pass.4 Yet this rhetorical exuberance seems, as in ancient 
times, to go hand in hand with a casual and inconsistent use of terms and a concomitant 
conceptual free for all. Especially revealing, and a key aspect of the (re)production of 
this ‘subjective incapacity’, is the interchangeability and conflation of the terms used to 
promote the extent of its innovative capacity: change, reform, transformation, 
revolution, disruption, paradigm shift, and so on, are used as synonyms and often 
without reflection on their use (BER, 2011; Boxall, 2102; Butin, 2012; Friedman, 2012; 
Long &Seimans, 2011). While there is little doubt that ‘changes are occurring,’ it is 
clearly the case that certain changes may secure existing practices rather than re-form 
them, while certain reforms may serve to strengthen set paradigms; equally, a 
‘disruption’ cannot itself be equated with a revolution. In effect, certain discourses of 
change may act as limits to rather than an extension of educational change. This is 
precisely what is meant by modification—as we will see. 
 
Between Globalisation and Universalism  
 
Unguarded assumptions concerning the subject of education abound—in both senses: 
education as the subject under debate and thus considered as an object and the subject 
with which education is concerned. I say the subject and not subjects because it is the 
subject which is precisely in question. What implicit, unthought theory of the subject are 
these debates working with or, more accurately here, what (theory of the) subject are 
these debates assuming? The continually invoked notion of ‘participation’ is one 
example: is the subject the outcome of participation? Is there a subject who participates 
or is participation, as in Plato, a subjective process in itself? And of course this only begs 
the question of just what it is one participates in. No doubt ‘education’ is what one is 
meant to be participating in, but this again begs the question, if not of ‘what it is’ then at 
least of which form of education is at stake. Is it the same form as prior to the digital 
revolution of all paradigms, or do they have in mind some other education? This 
applies, by the way, to those on ‘both sides’ of the claims for this new affective 
education—those who see it as coincident with the logic of capital, lets call it, and those 
who see it as emancipatory of it in some way.5 In reality, however, at the level of the 
subject of education – thus what it is and what it affects—it appears little has changed at 
all. What we certainly have is a new technique but the problem of a new technique—as 
Plato argued—is that it assumes the knowledge of the thing for which it is a technique. 
In other words, what type of the subject can technology produce? Is it ‘new’? Long and 
Seimans sum up this ‘all change’ succinctly. 
 
Something must change. For decades, calls have been made for reform in the 
efficiency and quality of higher education. Now, with the Internet, mobile 
technologies, and open education, these calls are gaining a new level of 
urgency. Compounding this technological and social change, prominent 
investors and businesspeople are questioning the time and monetary value of 
higher education (Long &Seimans, 2011). 
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We note that in each case we have referenced here, the address of the claims is always to 
all. These revolutionary changes issuing from some centre or other will as a matter of 
course affect everyone insofar as education is a global enterprise. And where such 
change is resisted—which is always also cast as a sign of barbarity, backwardness or 
even evil—it will be what education is for them too, one day soon. This is the case, even 
if the use of terms like ‘community’ is not without certain conceptual problems (as post-
colonialist studies have exemplarily argued), notably to do with modalities of exclusion. 
Since at least Marx, that other great thinker of the nexus of technology, knowledge and 
capital, we know that there are at last two ways to think the ‘all’ addressed by such 
discourses: in terms of globalisation and in terms of universalism. We can express this 
for our purposes this way: globalisation is the expression of what can be done with this 
for all (the subject of the address); universalism is the expression of what this for all can 
do (as subject). 
 
Education Considered as Transmission, Subjectivity and Transformation 
 
Under this distinction, let’s say, then, that there are three fundamental aspects to 
education, whether globalising or universalist: transmission, subjectivity and 
transformation. These—the means, form and address of a discourse; the material affect 
of participation (however understood); the name of the educational effect (again 
however understood)—one way or another, as we have seen, are recognised by all 
‘participants’ in the debate and by us who are not. These will act as the interlinked points 
by which we proceed to see what truth there is to the claims made for these digital 
technologies with regard to education. The discourse on MOOCs, as noted, certainly 
touches on each aspect and in turn conditions the form of their relation specific to it. 
But what is this change inscribed at the centre of this debate? What can change be in a 
world where change has established itself as the norm?Where the rapidly changing 
conditions of everyday life are supposed  beyond anyone’s control and where education 
is nominated as the facilitator not of these changes per se but as what provides subjects 
capable of adapting to or being flexible before this change?. Subjects, thus, capable 
(only?) of reproducing such ‘change’ as the ground of their subjectivity. These subjects 
are subject to the absolute un-changeability of the form of change that there is.  
In this sense, the much heralded move from ‘application’ to ‘platform’ does not at all 
challenge this subjective incapacity recognised in the ‘old ways’ but does ‘smooth over’ or 
plane-ify the contradiction that makes any thought of the subject possible. If all is 
platform or ‘plane of consistency’ over which content travels indiscriminately then there 
is no point—we have no doubt ‘violently imposed’ (Badiou, 2007, p. 510), what Badiou 
calls a ‘pointless’ or ‘atonal world’: 
 
it is clear that atonic worlds are simply worlds which are so ramified and 
nuanced—or so quiescent and homogeneous—that no instance of the Two, 
and consequently no figure of decision, is capable of evaluating them. The 
modern apologia for the ‘complexity’ of the world, invariably seasoned with 
praise for the democratic movement, is really nothing but a desire for 
generalized atony (Badiou, 2007, p. 420) 
 
Groy’s marks something similar when he says, ‘innovation has become a ritual’ (Groys, 
2011a). Referring specifically to internet technologies he continues that ‘all the processes 
of renewal and innovation etc. have become extra-human, extra-psychological, extra-
individual, and are functioning according to the circumvention of individual and 
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collective practices of remembering’. Moreover, ‘It’s just like these [post-modern 
academic grant] applications in which non-innovation [is] offered as innovation’ (Groys, 
2011a).6 In other words it is the pointless reproduction of pointless worlds, entirely 
possible because there is nothing not-it to interrupt the flow of ‘the conservative 
succession of instants’ (Badiou, 2007, p. 509). For Badiou, and for Groys too, however, 
the new is for all this not impossible, or rather it is the impossibility inscribed at the 
heart of the platform itself that must be affirmed, held to, and the consequences drawn. 
Badiou enigmatically says: ‘Every human animal can tell itself that it is ruled out that it 
will encounter always and everywhere atonicity…’ (2007, p. 514). 
 
This is the double paradox of discourses of change today, to which the technological, 
for all its intensity and audacity, reveals itself to be only an addition and not at all 
something new, something subtractive of or withdrawn from the contemporary 
knowledge of education. On the one hand it belongs to a paradigmatic logic of ends—
the end of history; the end of capitalism and parliamentary democracy as the apex of 
possible worlds—which is to say, there is now ‘nothing new under the sun’. And yet, 
grounded by this unchangeable horizon, which is of course, as ever, off limits to 
thought—inaccessible, ineffable, atavistically infinite or forever ‘emergent’—there is 
nothing but change. If modularity (Nash, 2013) is the name of the present void of the 
(educated) subject, modification is the transcendental condition of such a world. The 
cartoon character Homer Simpson provides us with a clear image of this state of the 
situation when, criticising some new commodity invention to difficult for him to master, 
he asks: ‘why didn’t they just take an existing product and put a clock in it?’ One can ask 
this question, slightly reframed, of the ‘reformers’ or change agents: Have you not just 
taken an existing product, education, and stuck a (digital) clock in it?  
 
The instrumentalisation of education considered as instrument. 
 
Without at all having to leave aside the commodity form of education—which is as 
intrinsic to this reform debate as it is symptomatic of its ignorance of education—the 
underlying assumption of this whole reform debate is that it knows already what 
education is. Paradoxically, in the midst of all this change, education—such as it is 
known—is unchangeable. What will and must in fact continually change—and thus 
difference is mistaken for the new—is the technique for its manipulation or 
instrumentalisation relevant to the demands of a logic extrinsic to it. Hence claims like: 
‘Analytics in education must be transformative, altering existing teaching, learning, and 
assessment processes, academic work, and administration’ (Long & Seimans, 
2011).Thus, if instrumentalised, no matter the technique, it is instrumentalised for 
something else, for something else beyond education itself. This something else, then, 
must presume to mark the limits of education itself? Which is to say, it takes the form of 
a known knowledge: a knowledge off limits to education. But there is another, further 
twist, for this knowledge of education, which in order to maintain itself must constantly 
alter its techniques in order to appear as the current knowledge of education, is 
constrained by an altogether immanent aspect of education: that it is fundamentally 
about change itself. In other words, the knowledge of education as a technique changes 
in order that the intrinsic capacity of education for change is made impossible, and from 
within the debates on education itself.  
The current debates about education are themselves being instrumentalised by the 
knowledge of education they presume, defer to and support in their efforts to 
instrumentalise education—theory, policy and practice—in support of that knowledge. 
We have an instrumentalisation of an instrumentalisation. And this doubling takes place 
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in order precisely to forestall the transformative effects of education as such—known to 
be troublesome for all states throughout history. Such effects are the immanent truths 
of any possible concept of education and, for all that, to adopt a notion of Groys, are as 
such withdrawn from the market or the logic of capital, which provides the temporal 
horizon of our contemporary knowledge. Education is something like a site relative to 
capitalist knowledge; it marks a divested point, an emptiness in the territory of capital. It 
remains over, and this indeed with regard to any ‘state knowledge’ (capitalism is simply 
the state of our situation), ‘for the purpose of creating something that was meant for 
eternity and not for time’ (Groys, 2011b).  
Appropriately, this contradiction, to use some old language, or disjunction, to 
appropriate some more recent, is not new—it is part of the history of education itself. 
Plato elaborates this for us in the struggle against the dominant market technique of his 
day, sophistry, which already offered the youth or ‘learner’ the knowledge necessary to 
know that the interests of the state were in their interest or, to make its individual way in 
the world as it is. This is the mark of an educated subject to this day—even if, following 
Rancière (1991) here, we should properly call this pedagogy and reserve the name 
education for that form which divests itself of this state pedagogy as the mode of its 
becoming true. That this disjunction, the effect of education’s intrinsic withdrawal, is a 
constant of debates on education should be pause for thought, especially amongst 
knowledgeable commentators on education. 
 
Can real change really be thought: the thinking that cannot not be done. 
 
Against this contemporary return and repetition of the sophistic motif, a twofold 
question must be posed: What is understood by change and what type of subject is 
conceived, supposed and created with regard to this technological conception of 
educational change? Of course these two questions are themselves somewhat 
supplementary to the question we invoked at the level of the concept: what is 
education?  This question, which cannot be answered with regard to technique alone, is 
always foreclosed in debate precisely because to even pose it supposes a distinct 
orientation to the knowledge of education. In other words it supposes the existence of a 
point outside knowledge other than on knowledge’s terms. We have elaborated a book-
length response to the question ‘what is education’ (Bartlett, 2011)? It maintains that it is 
demonstrable—it has a trajectory, consequences and an orientation that can be traced 
and established as consistent under varying conditions and relative to distinct situation.  
Thus we can say what it is and hence we can recognise when it is not. This cannot be 
elaborated here.  
However, the key to the demonstration is the intrinsic link between education and 
truths. Alain Badiou observed with all irony back in 1988 that, ‘truth is a new word in 
Europe’; but of course it is always what is at stake in education: that there is something 
other than known knowledge, that it invests the situation with new forms of 
transmission and that some subjects form or are transformed on the basis of it. In his 
2004 essay on the relation of Art (which produces the truths of the ‘art-world’) and 
Philosophy (the discourse of their composition with the truths of politics, love and 
science) Badiou makes the declaration, ‘the only education is an education by truths’.  
He continues: the ‘entire insistent problem is that there be truths’ (2004, p. 13-4). 
Without them, without their exceptionality to the normal course of things—assumptions, 
laws, beliefs, knowledge as such (Badiou, 2007, p.1) —education will be only a matter of 
received or established or dominant opinion; battered this way and that depending on 
the dictates or determinations of what norms or knowledge prevail outside it, but within 
the ‘class struggle in theory’ that is educational reform today.7 It is this link between 
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education and truths that means that education can be conceptualised, and with regard 
to what Badiou calls real change—as distinct from ‘modifications’ or ‘facts’.  
In the short space left we will reductively sketch out Badiou’s typology of change 
within which the discussed claims to change can be situated. From his earliest work in 
the 1960’s Badiou has been committed to conceptualising the form of real change; 
which is to say, ‘can there be something new in the situation’ (Badiou, 2005b, p. 253)? 
But of course, as he says, to think the new in situation we need to think the old. We 
have done some of that above. In his Logics of Worlds, a text from 2005 that builds on his 
formal reconfiguration of ontology in 1988’s Being and Event, Badiou sets out a formal 
onto-logically rigorous typology of change and links it explicitly to a type of subject. Its 
very useful to any thinking of education for three reasons which we will take one at a 
time.  
 
The truth/knowledge couple 
 
Badiou’s typology of change refers to a dynamic reconfiguration of the distinction 
between ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. Badiou opens Logics of Worlds by wondering what it is 
we think about our situation today, especially when we are not ‘monitoring’ ourselves (a 
suitably pedagogical term)(Badiou, 2007, p. 1). In other words, he asks ‘what is our 
natural belief’ – ‘in keeping’, he says, ‘with the rule of an inculcated nature’. He contends 
that ‘natural belief is condensed in a single statement: There are only bodies and 
languages’ (Badiou, 2007, p. 1). This is the axiom of ‘democratic materialism,’ which is 
for him the name of the knowledge of the world today – it is the knowledge that 
fashions us as individuals. Against this, Badiou proposes a counter axiom: ‘there are 
bodies and languages except that there are truths’ (Badiou, 2007, p. 4). Truths are 
exceptions to the inculcated, pedagogical rule of democratic materialism and as such, 
they are not reducible to or recoupable by knowledge—sensory, experiential or 
linguistic. The modes of change constitutive of the knowledge of ‘bodies and languages’ 
are irreducible to the form of change that has done with this knowledge itself. This 
latter form of change is exceptional to knowledge tout court. The key thing to note here 
is that what we called education or rather the change that is properly effective as 
education is the latter and not the former. The former are changes to education and not 
educational change. Changes to education are such that a) it treats it as an object of 
known knowledge and b) that works to forestall the real changes that (a non-democratic 
materialist) education announces and produces as a matter of course. A truth for Badiou 
is a generic, subjective and transformative procedure, while knowledge acts upon truths as 
a stabilising and reformist force. In other words, truths are dynamic and subjective 
interventions within situations or worlds of established knowledge, which produce 
precisely a new orientation to this world whose effect, affected point by point, is to 
displace this knowledge from within. Truths have to be established in fidelity to an 
event. They are not what is adequate to or an instance of established knowledge. Hence 
a true education is oriented to the world with regard to an established break with its 
knowledge, by what exposes there the site of its lack.  
 Knowledge as encyclopedia, as Badiou calls it, is predicated precisely on being 
coincident with the all of the whole. Badiou’s ontological formulations show the 
inconsistency of the latter – the One is not  (Badiou, 1999; 2005a)– and the theory of 
the event, authorized by this rigourous thinking of inconsistency as such, establishes 
that what is exposed by the event for a situation is this point of inconsistency. In short, 
there is always within any regime of knowledge its point of lack—its void-site in strict 
terms (making it categorically unlike Deleuze!)—around which it organises itself. This 
‘lack’ is the ‘excess’ (unknowable) that any such knowledge guards against and is 
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therefore a condition of its knowledge. In other words, knowledge cannot know the void 
or lack at its heart and must therefore produce as knowledge this non-knowledge. The 
debates on education that presume a knowledge of education in their debates and so rely 
on its currency in knowledge are, then, effectively producing the non-knowledge of their 
lack. Knowledge first and foremost produces its own lack of knowledge. But that is not 
the issue per se. Rather, it is the production of this lack as knowledge itself, that is, that 
this lack must not be known, that is the real horizon of this discourse or its genuine 
excess. For Badiou, while this excess is ‘incalculable’ and therefore cannot be known as 
such, it can be decided—in and through the construction of a generic, indiscernible or 
new set. In other words, to decide is absolutely consistent with what ontology 
formalises.8 
 Truths are not thereby of being itself but are totally contingent on the contingency of 
an event or the irruption in a situation or world of that which-is-not-being-qua-being.  
 
But neither is genuine change given to us on the side of appearing, or of the 
transcendental constitution of being-there, on the side, that is, of worlds. For 
the appearing of a being in a world is the same thing as its modifications in that 
world, without any discontinuity and thus any singularity being required for the 
deployment of these modifications (Badiou, 2007, p. 358). 
 
Truths are subjective productions, subtractive of being as of all knowledge. This 
distinction or coupling between truths and the knowledge which truths interrupt and 
avoid as a matter of course is operative in all forms of discourse specifically when change 
or the ‘new’ is at stake. 
 
Modif i cat ion,  fac t ,  s ingular i ty  – intens i ty  
 
Badiou elaborates a formal typology of change drawn from topos theory, itself a sub-set 
of Category Theory. The aim is still to trace the trajectory of a truth in a world but this 
time in terms of its appearing there. The sets of relations which affect and determine what 
it is to appear is what makes up the logic of appearance or ‘existence’, and topos theory 
provides a formal account of what Meillassoux calls the ‘diverse consistencies revealed 
to us in experience’ (2011, p. 6). What matter here are the three types of change made 
thinkable by such an onto-logy. These are: modifications, facts and real change or 
singularity. They are distinguished in terms of their intensity or affect and their relation to 
the transcendental specific to their world, which is to say, ‘established knowledge’. 
Approximating to the language of the above examples, modifications are akin to reform, 
facts to disruptions, and real change to transformationor the instance of the new.  
For Badiou any world, in terms of its appearing as such, is transcendentally 
structured. The transcendental is the ‘locus of the relations of identity and difference by 
means of which multiples make ‘worlds’’ (Badiou, 2011, p. 75). This is a relation of 
order of a specific sort in so far as what appears does so in terms of intensity and 
intensity is a matter of relation—the relation of one multiple to another. What appears 
most intensely in a specific world determines the intensity of appearing of the other 
multiples marked to exist in that world. A world is structured in terms of a maximal 
intensity of appearing or existence, and a minimum. ‘The intensities of objects and 
relations are measured according to a singular temporal transcendental, which 
objectivates in their appearing multiplicities…’ (Badiou, 2007, p. 359).In a world, for 
example, where knowledge provides the transcendental rule, those deemed 
knowledgeable will appear more intensely than the unknowledgeable or ‘uneducated’. 
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This is a reductive example but accurate enough. Most objects relative to a world, 
Badiou says, appear somewhere in the middle.  
It is impossible to flesh out the entire nuance, let alone all the technical apparatus. If 
we understand that to appear in a world is to appear for the transcendental of a world, 
thus relative the knowledge of the sets of relations organised vis-à-vis the order of 
intensity, then what we need to know is simply: ‘[…] the appearing of a being in a world 
is the same thing as its modifications in that world, without any discontinuity and thus 
any singularity being required for the deployment of these modifications’ (Badiou, 2007, 
p. 358). In a world stabilised by an established knowledge, one in which any point of 
difference, such that its difference cannot be marked by that knowledge is always 
already the operation of a modification. To be-there with some degree of intensity above 
the minimum (which is to inexist for a world (which is not to not be)) is to exist as and 
to consist in being modified.  
 
[T]his logical identity of a world is the transcendental indexing of a 
multiplicity—an object—as well as the deployment of its relations to other 
multiplicities which appear in that world. There is no reason to suppose that 
we are dealing with a fixed universe of objects and relations, from which we 
would have to separate out modifications. Rather, we are dealing with 
modifications themselves… (Badiou, 2007, p. 358) 
 
In other words, then, modification, as the ‘rule governed appearing’ of difference as 
such is the norm of a world and is not change.  
Change is something more than mere modification and something distinct from a 
fact. However, while modifications are coincident with the transcendental, a fact and a 
singularity (real change) have in common what Badiou calls a ‘site’. In short, a site marks 
the limit point within a world or situation of established knowledge. Beneath the site, so 
to speak, there is nothing—it marks the point of inexistence or an abnormality 
inadmissible to the logic of the state: it is present but not represented; its parts are un-
knowable.  A fact, then, is a site, Badiou says, ‘whose intensity of existence is not 
maximal’ (Badiou, 2007, p. 372). It is not evental. It does not carry in its becoming the 
disruptive force necessary to effect a change in the logic of that world itself. While a fact 
is not of the law as such, it cannot alter this law either. A fact points at change but is not 
itself real change. A fact is recoverable for a world.  
 Badiou admits into the schema a distinction in singularity between weak and strong. 
A weak singularity is an evental site such that it does not produce consequences. In 
other words, it cannot make a minimal existence pass into a maximal as can an event or 
strong singularity. A strong singularity—which is an event—is ‘a site whose intensity of 
existence is maximal’ (Badiou, 2007, p. 372).  Every world admits an element properly 
inexistent to it. This properly inexistent will be an element of a site. If there is an event, 
it is the eruption of this properly inexistent or that which exists minimally for that 
world, such that what happens becomes the index of its happening: hence ‘singularity’. 
The minimally appearing element of that world comes to appear maximally—which, 
given the site has no known or presented elements, is patently illegal. So an appearing 
minimal of a site, of a sudden appears maximally. What the event signifies is the non-
impossibility of a change in that order—in the ‘unbroken phrasing of the world’—as 
Badiou says. However, this is not enough—the world is not changed—except that an 
exception has been marked: that an exception is not impossible. But maximality is 
consequential. In the world as it goes, there is a maximal appearing and this gives the 
world its rule—the order to its appearing and thus when the minimal becomes maximal 
the possibility exists that the entirety of the transcendental order be changed—nothing 
Innovations	
  in	
  incapacity	
  
 13 
becomes everything. So if ‘nothing’ or rather the trace of the event (events as such 
appear to disappear) comes to occupy this place, or in other words to present itself as 
the new point of orientationfor the conjunction of a topos (or world)—a new form of 
collection—all relations are up for grabs. This trace, Badiou says, is the ‘eternal’ 
existence of the inexistent, the outline or statement, in the world, of the disappeared 
event. Education, we can say is this trace, manifest in the object body constructed by a 
subject point by point—an orientation, a trajectory, a materiality, a transformation, 
addressed to all. ‘There is no stronger transcendental consequence than the one which 
makes what did not exist in a world appear within it’ (Badiou, 2007, p. 376). The event 
gives to the subject the chance of an other orientation than that deemed to exist. ‘The 
event is neither past nor future. It presents us with the present’ (2007, p. 384). 
 
The subject (of education) 
 
These modes of change are elaborated with a theory of the subject linked generically to 
both truths and transformation. In this way education is linked to truthsor what is new, 
beyond what is already known and thus intrinsically to change (Badiou, 2005b; 2007): 
and not extrinsically as for reform movements and technical ‘innovators’. The three 
types of the subject derived are the reactionary, obscurantist and faithful.9The key is that 
each subjective type is also linked for a particular world to a singular event of that world. 
Subjects, then, are reactionary to, occlusive of or faithful to an event. These figures of the 
subject are the appearance of three forms of subjectivisation, relative to the ‘new body 
in the world’ an event makes possible. That of the reactionary is of an ‘indifference: to 
act as though nothing has taken place or, more exactly, to be convinced that, were the 
event not to have occurred, things would be basically the same’. It ‘quashes what is new 
within the soft power of conservation’. The subjectivisation of the occlusive ‘is hostility: 
to consider the new body as a malevolent foreign irruption that must be destroyed. In 
this hatred of the new, of all that is ‘modern’ and different from tradition, we recognize 
obscurantism’ (Badiou, 2011, pp. 91-2). Thus the obscurantist changes or intensifies its 
forms of rhetoric or, if in a position to do so, its repressive capacities in order to make 
sure there is no fundamental change, while the reactive subject adapts to the world in 
terms of its ordinary modifications since ‘there is no alternative’. Conceptions of 
education correlated to either of these forms of subjectivisation cannot be considered 
educational precisely because they refuse to think the impossibility of their worlds and 
so pre-suppose a knowledge of the limits of knowledge as such—which cannot itself be 
known.  
 Real change is the upheaval in a world of the very logic that holds it together, that 
provides its consistency, and is at the same time the procedure by which a new truth of 
that world is set out for it, point by point and by which a new body or subjective 
formation for that world is constructed—one that draws on the equal capacity of all 
inhabitants of that world to ‘not know its knowledge’.  In other words the faithful 
subject is marked by its ‘incorporation within the [new] body, enthusiasm for what is 
new, and active fidelity to that happening that locally disrupted the laws of the world 
through its advent’ (Badiou, 2011, p. 91). Somewhat enigmatically fidelity marks that: 
 
a truth process is the construction of a new body that appears gradually in the 
world as all the multiples having an authentic affinity with a primordial 
statement are drawn together around the latter. And as the primordial 
statement is the trace of an event's power, we can also say that a body of truth 
results from the incorporation within the consequences of an event of 
everything, within the world, that has been maximally impacted by its power 
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(Badiou, 2011, p. 90). 
 
Here is the crux. Badiou’s ontology and its onto-logy too, establish via a universalisation 
of non-inclusion the not-impossible belonging of all to the new truth of the situation. 
Real change is correlated to the non-knowledge of the situation, exposed in the event, 
whose consequences are drawn by the subject—as its thought/practice or as what is 
education. 
 
Conclusion: One more effort please… 
 
Technology is always much weaker than its advocates seem to believe. In truth this 
weakness is concentrated in this belief. In 1795, when the French Revolution had gone 
over to the side of restoration the Marquis de Sade wrote a tract extolling his fellow 
countrymen: ‘Frenchmen, one more effort please if you would become Republicans’. 
Sade offered a new radicality to what it meant to ‘become Republican’, to follow this 
‘desire’ right to the end.  Without this, he declared, the real ‘murderers and thieves’, the 
state and the wealthy, would keep on getting away with it. The rhetoric of the MOOC, 
of its educational capacity, despite the animate desire of its most wide eyed proponents, 
only delivers this new technique over to the hands of those in the position to continue 
to get away with determining for all what education is. Despite what such technological 
innovations can do, what possibilities they suppose, MOOCs and their like will remain 
inscribed in the vicious, expansive circle of capitalist or state logic, replicating and 
repeating, modifying over and again the subjective incapacity this logic demands. The 
weakness of technology, shackled to this logic, is that it never actually does do what is 
claimed, that its subjectivisation is actually of a bastard kind—it engenders what it does 
not want and wants what it cannot engender.  Beneath all the fanfare of its arrival, its 
result—the intensification of the procedures of the pedagogy that already exists—
commands only new rounds of cynicism, fatalism, defeatism: in the last instance and at 
best an emergent ecstatic nihilism supported by a hybrid humanism-vitalism which is 
destined to merely repeat, with difference to be sure but without the very possibility of 
the new. Such is why the rhetoric of the MOOC is so fervent, so desperate, so hollow: 
the symptom, nevertheless, of a real desire which demands to be taken up. If the 
greatest efforts of technique return us yet again and with greater intensity to what there 
is then what is there? What can be done? This is the trace of an education, the force of the 
subject, the demand that we truly recommence. 
 
Notes 
 
1Butin (2012) cites Kevin Carey: the ‘monopoly has begun to crumble. New 
organizations are being created to offer new kinds of degrees, in a manner and at a price 
that could completely disrupt the enduring college business model.’ 
2 While we think the notion of revolution is overwrought, though as hysterical, 
instructive, we might add, that it’s a class one too. Of the kind perhaps Marx and Engels 
allude to in the Manifesto – ‘The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary 
part’ (48). Gramsci, in the PrisonNotebooks) notes that under the bourgeoisie ‘the state 
has become an educator’, while Rancière in TheIgnorantSchoolmaster) will call this rule of 
knowledge that designates the sites of non-knowledge the pedagogicisation of society.  
3Butin is quoting Kevin Carey.  
4 While some advocates acknowledge the privacy implications, they are certainly not 
considered to be overarching. The nexus of capital, knowledge and surveillance is 
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finding a new avatar. There are many books and articles now dealing with the question 
of ‘digital labour’ but the key qualifier here is the notion of education, which is the 
trump card for the business investors. Under the cover of ‘learning’ almost anything is 
possible – as it once was under the cover of God. 
5 In the words of one commentator: ‘A fully-automated, massively-networked, natural 
language processing, data-driven, feedback-friendly, learning analytics system’ (Butin 
2012). 
6‘For example, if you want to obtain funding for a scientific or artistic grant application, 
you will, of course, have to explain what the new results of this application will be even 
if you are thinking in a postmodern fashion. I have read a great many applications of 
this kind. They all were, or are, postmodern, and they all claim in their texts that there is 
nothing new. But in the rationale for why they should receive money, it suddenly 
transpires that they have absolutely revolutionary, new insights. We are living in this 
situation in which we want to be innovative not because we are driven by creative 
insights and energies, but because we are carrying out the rituals of innovation, which 
are repetitive in themselves’ (Groys 2011). 
7After Rancière’s thoroughgoing critique of Althusser, which is indeed a lesson, we use 
this term with some irony and not at all to support the notion. Rather, the education 
debates referred to here are internecine insofar as most participants share a concept of 
education and, as mostly academics, a ‘class’ position – whether related to ‘cultural 
capital’ or otherwise. 
8 For this concept of the generic or the new Badiou draws on the work in transfinite set 
theory of mathematician Paul Cohen. That a generic set, one not bound in its 
construction to any existing predicates, can be shown to exist serves as the formal 
model of how a truth can be thought entirely distinct from knowledge. As generic, a 
truth is ‘for all’ in so far as there is nothing to prevent ‘anyone’ being connected to it. 
Indeed, its that everyone shares the capacity to not be known by the ‘state’ – represented 
by it or included in it (or counted as one-part by the powerset) – that is the basis for 
some new truth of a world. Forcing, the ‘law of the subject’, is intrinsically related to this 
set and is another of Cohen’s terms. Forcing is the operation by which this generic set 
or new truth (everything being a ‘multiple’) come to be in or for a world.  Coming from 
the ‘nothing’ that is there this new collection of elements forces the situation to change 
on the basis of its capacity to demonstrate or to manifest its being there as a part of that 
world – precisely ‘where and when’ no such part could be known. See Being and Event, 
Part VII. 
9 There is a fourth mode of the subject – resurrection … 
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